Recent crises in the financial industry have shown weaknesses in the modeling of Risk-Weighted Assets (RWA). Relatively minor model changes may lead to substantial changes in the RWA numbers. Similar problems are encountered in the VaR-aggregation of risks. In this article we highlight some of the underlying issues, both methodologically as well as through examples. In particular we frame this discussion in the context of two recent regulatory documents we refer to as Basel 3.5.
Introduction
In May 2001, the first author contributed to the influential and highly visible Daníelsson et al. (2001) . In their academic response to, at the time, Basel 2 the authors were spot on concerning the weaknesses within the prevailing, international regulatory framework, as well as for the way in which larger international banks were managing market, credit and operational risk. We cite from their Executive Summary:
• The proposed regulations fail to consider the fact that risk is endogenous. Value-at-Risk can destabilize an economy and induce crashes [. . .] • Statistical models used for forecasting risk have been proven to give inconsistent and biased forecasts, notably underestimating the joint downside risk of different assets. The Basel Committee has chosen poor quality measures of risk when better risk measures are available.
• Heavy reliance on credit rating agencies for the standard approach to credit risk is misguided [. . .] • Operational risk modeling is not possible given current databases [. . .] • Financial regulation is inherently procyclical [. . .] the purpose of financial regulation is to reduce the likelihood of systemic crises, these proposals will actually tend to negate, not promote this useful purpose.
1 And as summary:
• Perhaps our most serious concern is that these proposals, taken altogether, will enhance both the procyclicality of regulation and the susceptibility of the financial system to systemic crises, thus negating the central purpose of the whole exercise. Reconsider before it is too late.
Unfortunately, five years later it was too late! The above quotes serve two purposes: first, academia has a crucial role to play in commenting officially on proposed changes in the regulatory landscape. Second, when well-documented, properly researched and effectively communicated, we may have an influence on regulatory and industry practice.
For the purpose of this paper, we refer to the regulatory document BCBS (2012) as Basel 3.5 for the trading book; Basel 4 is already on the regulatory horizon, even if the implementation of Basel 3 is only planned for 2019. In particular, through its consultative document BCBS (2013b), the Basel Committee went already a step beyond BCBS (2012), indeed "the Committee has its intention to pursue two key confirmed reforms outlined in the first consultative paper BCBS (2012): stressed calibration [. . .] move from Value-at-Risk (VaR) to Expected Shortfall (ES)". Our comments are also relevant for insurance regulation's Solvency 2, now planned in the EU for January 1, 2016. The Basel 3.5 document arose out of consultations between the regulators, industry and academia, and this in the wake of the subprime crisis. It also paid attention to and remedied some of the criticisms raised in Daníelsson et al. (2001) ; we shall exemplify this below. Among the various issues raised, for our purpose, the following question (Nr.8, p.41) 
in BCBS (2012), is relevant:
"What are the likely constraints with moving from Value-at-Risk (VaR) to Expected Shortfall (ES), including any challenges in delivering robust backtesting and how might these be best overcome?"
Since its introduction around 1994, VaR has been criticized by numerous academics as well as practitioners for its weaknesses as the benchmark (see Jorion (2006) ) for the calculation of regulatory capital in banking and insurance:
W1 VaR says nothing concerning the what-if question: "Given we encounter a high loss, what can be said about its magnitude?"; W2 For high confidence levels, e.g. 95% and beyond, the statistical quantity VaR can only be estimated with considerable statistical as well as model uncertainty, and W3 VaR may add up the wrong way, i.e. for certain (one-period) risks it is possible that
(1.1)
The fact that the above concerns about VaR are well founded can be learned from some of the recent political discussions concerning banking regulation and the financial crisis. Proof of this is for instance to be found in USS (2013, p.13) and UKHLHC (2013, p.119); we quote explicitly from these documents as they nicely summarize some of the key practical issues facing more quantitative regulation of modern financial markets.
Before doing so, we recall the terminology of RWA=Risk-Weighted Asset. In general terms, banking solvency is based on a quotient of capital (specifically defined through levels of liquidity) to RWAs. The latter are the risk numbers associated with trading or credit positions mainly based on mark-to-market or mark-to-model values. Also included is risk capital for operational risk which can easily reach the 20-30% range of the total RWAs. In these numbers, risk measures like VaR appear prominently. In general, financial engineers (includin g mathematicians) and their products/models play a crucial role in determining these RWAs. Accountants are typically more involved with the numerator, capital. Below we list some quotes related to the concerns about
VaR. The highlighting is ours.
Quote 1 (from USS (2013)): "End of Quarter 1, 2012, the RWAs were down from 20 to 13 Bio USD, and this based on three VaR-model changes. The change in VaR methodology effectively masked the significant changes in the portfolio." The quote refers to JPMorgan Chase.
Quote 2 (from UKHLHC (2013)): "From a former employee of HBOS: We actually got an external advisor [to asses how frequently a particular event might happen] and they came out with one in 100,000 years and we said «no», and I think we submitted one in 10,000 years. But that was a year and a half before it happened. It doesn't mean to say it was wrong: it was just unfortunate that the 10,000th year was so near."
Quote 3 The RWA uncertainty issue is very well addressed in BCBS (2013a) (in particular p.6), indeed: "There is considerable variation across banks in average RWAs for credit risk. In broad terms, the variation is similar to that found for market risk in the trading book. Much of the variation (up to three quarters) is explained by the underlying differences in the risk composition of the banks' assets, reflecting differences in risk preferences as intended under the risk-based capital framework. The remaining variation is driven by diversity in both bank and supervisory practices." The supervision of the euro area's biggest banks by the European Central Bank will very much concentrate on RWAs in its asset-quality reviews; see The Economist (2013).
Though ES also suffers from W2, it partly corrects W1 and always adds up correctly (≤), i.e. ES is subadditive (corrects W3). Of course, the "one number can't suffice" paradigm also holds for ES; see Rootzén and Klüp-pelberg (1999 2 How much superadditive can VaR be?
In Embrechts et al. (2013) , the question is addressed how large the gap between the left-and right-hand side in (1.1) can be. The answer is very much related to the issue of model uncertainty (MU), especially at the level of inter-dependence, i.e. dependence uncertainty.
Let us first recall the standard definitions of VaR and ES. Suppose X is a random variable (rv) with distribution function (df) F X , F X (x) = P(X ≤ x) for x ∈ R. For 0 ≤ α < 1, we then define
and
Whenever F X is continuous, it follows that
leading to the standard interpretation for ES as a conditional expected loss. The ES and its equivalence in the continuous setting, are known under different names and abbreviations such as TVaR, CVaR, CTE, TCE and AVaR. When discrete distributions are involved, the above cited notions are not more equivalent; see Acerbi and Tasche (2002) . Throughout the paper also let VaR 1 (X) = F −1 X (1) = inf{x ∈ R : F X (x) = 1} be the essential supremum of the support of X.
Our set-up is as follows.
• Suppose X 1 , . . . , X d are one-period risk positions with dfs
We assume F 1 , . . . , F d to be known for the purpose of our discussion. In practice this may correspond to models fitted to historical data, or models chosen in a stress-testing environment. One could also envisage empirical dfs when sufficient data are available. Important is that in the analyses and examples below we disregard statistical uncertainty; this can, and should be added in a full-scale discussion. As a consequence, for the purpose of this paper MU should henceforth be interpreted as functional-MU at the level of inter-dependence rather than statistical-MU. Full MU would combine (at least) both.
• Consider the portfolio position X
The techniques discussed below would also allow for the analysis of other portfolio structures like for instance
for some m > 0, typically large. MU results for such more general examples however need further detailed study; see Embrechts et al. (2013) for some remarks on this.
• Denote by VaR α (X i ), i = 1, . . . , d, the marginal VaRs at the common confidence level α ∈ (0, 1), typically close to 1. For the moment we concentrate on VaR as a risk measure, as it still is the regulatory benchmark.
Other risk measures will appear later in the paper. Asmussen and Glynn (2007) (Chapter VI) . For a more geometric approach, useful in lower dimensions, say d ≤ 5, see Arbenz et al. (2011 Arbenz et al. ( , 2012 ).
When we relax from a full joint distributional assumption (a single model) to a specific subclass of models, it may be possible to obtain some inequalities or asymptotics (in
see McNeil et al. (2005, Theorem 6.8 ). An important subclass of elliptical distributions form the so-called multivariate normal variance mixture models, i.e.
(ii) W ≥ 0 is a non-negative, scalar-valued rv which is independent of Z, and
See McNeil et al. (2005, Section 3 .2) for this definition. For the most general definition based on affine transformations of spherical random vectors, see McNeil et al. (2005, Section 3.3.2) . In many ways, elliptical models are like "heaven" for finance and risk management; see McNeil et al. (2005, Theorem 6 .8 and Proposition 6.13).
Unfortunately, and this in particular in moments of stress, the world of finance may be highly non-elliptical.
A further interesting class of models results for X comonotonic, i.e. there exist increasing functions ψ i , i = 1, . . . , d, and an rv Z so that
and in that case 
The terminology, best versus worst, of course very much depends on the situation at hand: whether one is long or short in a trading environment or whether the bounds are interpreted by a regulator or a bank, say.
We further comment on notation: recall that the only available information so far are the marginal distributions of the risks, i.e.
. Whenever we use a joint distribution function F with those given marginals for the vector X, we denote X 
As with F above, the upper C-index highlights the fact that the joint df of (X 1 , .
Rewriting the optimization problem (2.3)-(2.4) in its equivalent copula form (2.5)-(2.6) stresses the fact that, once we are given the marginal dfs F i , i = 1, . . . , d, solving for VaR and VaR amounts to finding the copulas which, together with the F i s, achieve these bounds. Hence, solving for (2.3)-(2.4), or equivalently for (2.5)-(2.6) (the set-up we will usually consider) one obtains the MU-interval for fixed marginals:
If an inequality in (2.7) becomes an equality for a given copula C, the corresponding copula C is referred to as an optimal coupling. A current important area of research corresponds to finding the bounds in (2.7), analytically and/or numerically, prove sharpness under specific conditions and find the corresponding optimal couplings.
The interval VaR
) yields a measure for MU across all possible joint models as a function of inter-dependencies between the marginal factors (recall that we assume the F i s to be known!). So far, we assume no prior knowledge about the inter-dependence among the marginal risks X 1 , . . . , X d . If extra, though still incomplete information, like for instance "all X i 's are positively correlated" is available, then the above MU interval narrows. An important question becomes: can one quantify such MU? This is precisely the topic treated in Embrechts et al. (2013); Bignozzi and Tsanakas (2013); Barrieu and Scandolo (2013) . There is a multitude of both analytic as well as numeric (algorithmic) results. We consider three measures relevant for the MU discussion; the confidence level α ∈ (0, 1) is fixed.
Measure 1
The model-specific superadditivity ratio for the aggregate loss X
where we define VaR
The superadditivity ratio measures the noncoherence, equivalently, the superadditivity gap of VaR for a given joint model for X. As such it yields an indication of how far VaR can be away from being able to properly describe diversification.
Measure 2 The worst superadditivity ratio:
( 2.9) between the worst-possible VaR and the comonotonic VaR. It measures the superadditivity gap across all joint models with given marginals.
Measure 3
The ratio between worst-possible ES and worst-possible VaR:
(2.10) it relates to the question in Basel 3.5 from the Introduction.
In the next section, we discuss some of the methodological results leading to estimates for (2.3)-(2.10);
these are based on some very recent mathematical developments on dependence uncertainty. Section 4 contains several numerical examples. Section 5 addresses the robust backtesting question for VaR and comments on the possible change from VaR to ES for regulatory purposes. We draw a conclusion in Section 6. As it stands, the paper has a dual goal: first it provides a broadly accessible critical assessment of the VaR versus ES debate triggered by Basel 3.5. At the same time we list several areas of ongoing and possible future research that may come out of these discussions.
Mathematical developments on dependence uncertainty
Questions of the type (2.3)-(2.6) go back a long way in probability theory: an early solution for d = 2
was given independently by Makarov (1981) , a student of A. N. Kolmogorov from whom Makarov obtained the problem, and Rüschendorf (1982) with a different approach. This type of questions belongs to a rather specialized area of multivariate probability theory, and is mathematically non-trivial to answer. Although at the moment of writing this paper we still do not yet have complete answers, recently significant progress has been made providing insight not only in the mathematical theory in this area but also yielding answers to practically relevant questions.
To investigate problems with dependence uncertainty like (2.3)-(2.6), it is useful to define the set of all possible aggregations:
Such problems lead to research on the probabilistic properties of and statistical inference in this set S d (S d was formally introduced in Bernard et al. (2013a) , but all prior research in this area dealt in some form or another with the same framework). For example, the questions (2.3)-(2.4) can be rephrased as
A full characterization of S d is still out of reach; recently however, significant progress has been made, especially in the so-called homogeneous case. We refer to a recent book Rüschendorf (2013) for an overview of research on extremal problems with marginal constraints and dependence uncertainty. In particular, the book provides links between (2.3)-(2.6) and copula theory, mass-transportation and financial risk analysis.
The homogeneous case
Let us first look at the case Proposition 3.1 (Corollary 3.7 of , in a slightly different form). Suppose that the density function of F is decreasing on [β, ∞) for some β ∈ R. Then, for α ∈ [F (β), 1) and
Moreover, suppose that the density function of F is decreasing on its support. Then for α ∈ (0, 1) and X d ∼F ,
Although the expressions (3.2)-(3.4) look somewhat complicated, they can be reformulated using the notion of duality which dates back to Rüschendorf (1982) , and the resulting dual representation originated in the theory of mass-transportation. The following proposition provides an equivalent representation of (3.2). It is stated in Puccetti and Rüschendorf (2013) , in a slightly modified form and under a more general condition of complete mixability.
Proposition 3.2. Under the same assumptions of Propostion 3.1, suppose that for any sufficiently large threshold s it is possible to find a < s/d such that
The proof of Propositions 3.1 and 3.2 are based on the recently introduced and further developed mathematical concept of complete mixability.
Definition 3.1 (Wang and Wang (2011)). The marginal distribution F is said to be d-completely mixable if
Recent results on complete mixability are summarized in Wang and Wang (2011) and Puccetti et al. (2012) ;
an earlier study on the problem of constant sums can be found in Rüschendorf and Uckelmann (2002) , with ideas that originated from the early 80's (see Rüschendorf (2013) ). A necessary and sufficient condition for distributions with monotone densities to be completely mixable is given in Wang and Wang (2011) ; it is used in the proof of the bounds in Propositions 3.1 and 3.2.
Complete mixability, as opposed to comonotonicity, corresponds for this problem to extreme negative dependence. In other words, VaR is obtained through a concept of extreme negative correlation (given that correlation exists) between conditional distributions, instead of maximal correlation as discussed in Section 2. This rather counter-intuitive mathematical observation partially answers why VaR is non-subadditive, and warns that regulatory or pricing criteria based on comonotonicity are not as conservative as one may think.
So far, conditional complete mixability and hence sharpness of the dual bound for VaR α (X + d ) has only been shown for dfs satisfying the tail-decreasing density condition of Proposition 3.1. Of course, this condition is satisfied by most distributional models used in risk management practice. For such models we are hence able to calculate (3.1), ∆ α (X + d ) and B α (X + d ) as defined in (2.9) and (2.10). Examples will be given later.
Towards the inhomogeneous case
When the assumption of homogeneity F 1 = · · · = F d is removed, analytical results become much more challenging to obtain. The connection between (3.1) and the concept of convex order turns out to be relevant.
Relations between the two concepts were described in Bernard et al. (2013a, Theorem 4.6 ) and Bernard et al. 
Proposition 3.3. Suppose dfs F 1 , . . . , F d have positive densities on their supports, then for α ∈ (0, 1),
where the essential infimum of a random variable S is defined as ess-infS = sup{t ∈ R : P(S ≤ t) = 0}, and the essential supremum of a random variable S is defined as ess-supS = inf{t ∈ R : P(S ≤ t) = 1}.
As a consequence, it is shown that the worst VaR in S d (F 1 , . . . , F d ) is attained by a minimal element with
In some cases, for instance under assumptions of complete mixability, even smallest elements with respect to convex order can be given, but in general there may not be such a smallest element. Recent attempts to find analytical solutions for minimal convex ordering elements have been summarised in Bernard et al. (2013a) . Based on current knowledge we are only able to calculate (3.1), ∆ α (X Another important issue is the optimal coupling structure for the worst VaR. From Proposition 3.3 we can see that the interdependence (copula) between the random variables can be set arbitrarily in the lower region of the marginal supports, and only the tail dependence (in a region of probability 1 − α in each margin) matters for the worst VaR value. In the tail region, a smallest element in the convex order sense solves these "sup-inf" and "inf-sup" problems (3.7)-(3.8).
To be more precise, each of the individual risks are coupled in a way such that, conditional on that they are all large, their sum is concentrated around a constant (ideally, the sum is a constant, but this is not realistic in many cases). That is why conditional complete mixability plays an important role in the optimal coupling for the worst VaR (the optimal coupling for the best VaR is similar, just the conditional region now is a (typically large) interval of pro bability α). This also leads to the fact that information on overall correlation, such as the linear correlation coefficient or Spearman's rho, may not directly affect the value of the worst VaR. Even with a constraint that the risks in a portfolio are uncorrelated or mildly correlated, the worst VaR may still be reached. This, to some extent, warns about the danger of using a single number as dependence indicator in a quantitative risk management model. In the recent paper Bernard et al. (2013b) , it has been shown that additional variance constraints may lead to essentially improved VaR bounds.
Numerical optimization
Numerical methods are regarded as very useful when it comes to optimization problems. One such method is the rearrangement algorithm (RA) introduced in Puccetti and Rüschendorf (2012b) which was modified, extended and further discussed with applications to quantitative risk management in Embrechts et al. (2013) .
The RA is a simple but fast algorithm designed to approximate convex minimal elements in a set S d through discretization. The RA allows for a fast and accurate computation of the bounds in (3.1) for arbitrary marginal dfs, both in the homogeneous as well as inhomogeneous case. The method uses a discretization step of the relevant quantile region (N = 10 6 , say) resulting in a N × d matrix on which, through successive operations, a matrix with minimal variance for the row-sums (think of complete mixability) is obtained. The RA can easily handle large dimensionality problems of d ≈ 1000, say. For details and examples, see Embrechts et al. (2013) . As argued in ?, the numerical approximations obtained through the RA suggest that the bound VaR in Proposition 3.1 is sharp for all commonly used marginal distributions, and this without the requirement of a tail-decreasing density. Up to now, we do not have a formal proof of this. In Bernard et al. (2013b) , an extension of the RAcalled ERA -is introduced and shown to give reliable bounds for the variance constrained VaR.
Asymptotic equivalence of worst VaR and worst ES
For any random variable Y , VaR α (Y ) is bounded above by ES α (Y ). As a consequence the worst case VaR is bounded above by the worst case ES, i.e.
3.9) gives a simple way to calculate upper bounds of the worst VaR. This bound implies that
(3.10)
It was an observation made in Puccetti and Rüschendorf (2012c) that the bound in (3.9) is asymptotically sharp under general conditions, i.e. an asymptotic equivalence of worst VaR and worst ES holds.
The exact identity of worst-possible VaR and ES estimates holds for bounded homogeneous portfolios when the common marginal distribution is completely mixable, as indicated in the following remark. and a constant k such that
By the definition of VaR in (2.1), we then have that
Because of (3.9), equations (3.11) and (3.12) imply
The above example suggests a strong connection between VaR α (X The asymptotic equivalence of worst VaR and worst ES was established in Puccetti and Rüschendorf (2012c) in the homogeneous case based on the dual bounds in Embrechts and Puccetti (2006) and an assumption of conditional complete mixability. The following extension to some class of inhomogeneous models was given in Puccetti et al. (2013, Theorem 4 .2) based on new sufficient condition to complete mixability. Assume also that F j has a finite, positive mean and is continuous with a continuous and positive density on
The assumptions of the positive density and the continuity of the marginals in Proposition 3.4 were later removed in . A notion of asymptotic mixability (asymptotically constant sum) implies the asymptotic equivalence of worst VaR and worst ES (see Puccetti and Rüschendorf (2012a) ; Bernard et al. (2013b) ), indicating that this equivalence is connected with the law of large numbers and can be expected under general conditions on the marginal distributions. The equivalence (3.13) is also suggested by several numerical examples (see Examples 4.1 and 4.2 in Section 4).
Remark 3.2. An immediate consequence from (3.13) is that in the finite mean, homogeneous case, when
Generally speaking, the worst superadditivity ratio
) in all homogeneous and inhomogeneous models of practical interest. In other words, we can say that the worst VaR is almost as extreme as the worst ES for d large. It is worth pointing out that the worst superadditivity ratio
) is infinite; this is consistent with (3.14) and was shown in Puccetti and Rüschendorf (2012c) . Models leading to (estimated) infinite mean risks have attracted considerable attention in the literature; see for instance the early contribution Nešlehová et al. (2006) within the realm of operational risk and Delbaen (2009) for a more methodological point of view. Clearly, ES is not defined in this case, nor does there exist any non-trivial coherent risk measure on the space of infinite mean rvs; see Delbaen (2009) . As a consequence, as VaR is always well-defined, it may become a risk measure of "last resort". We shall not enter into a more applied "pro versus contra" discussion on the topic here, but just stress the extra insight our results give within the context of Basel 3.5. In particular, note that for infinite mean risks the worst VaR grows much faster than the comonotonic one. 
Examples
By (3.14), the ratio between the ES and the VaR of a random variable represents a degree of superadditivity which is peculiar to its distribution: it measures how badly VaR can behave in a homogeneous model. We start computing the ES/VaR ratio in some homogeneous examples F 1 = . . . = F d and later discuss some inhomogeneous examples.
The Pareto case
Power-laws of the type (4.1) are omnipresent in finance and insurance, often with θ values in the range [0.5, 5];
see Embrechts et al. (1997, Chapter 6) . The lower range [0.5,1] typically corresponds to catastrophe insurance, the upper one, [3, 5] , to market return data. Operational risk data typically spans the whole range, and indeed beyond; see Moscadelli (2004) and Gourier et al. (2009) .
Under (4.1) we have that for θ > 0, α ∈ (0, 1),
and for θ > 1, α ∈ (0, 1),
As a consequence, we have that for i = 1, . . . , d,
.
As the Pareto distribution (4.1) is unbounded from above, the latter equation implies that
Result (4.2) holds true if we replace the exact Pareto df in (4.1) by a so-called power-tail-like df, i.e.
where L is a so-called slowly varying function in Karamata's sense; see McNeil et al. (2005, Definition 7 .7). For fast decaying tails, like in the normal case, the limit in (4.2) equals 1, so that for α close to 1, there is not much difference between using Value-at-Risk or Expected Shortfall as a basis for risk capital calculations. In the case of Pareto tails, the difference can however be substantial. In Tables 1-3 we illustrate values for the ES/VaR ratio for Pareto, Lognormal and Exponential distributions. Combined with (3.14), for α close to 1, these results already yield a fast, rough estimate for
For example, in the case of the above Pareto(θ) df with θ = 2, from (3.14) and (4.2) we expect values Table 1 confirms. Table 4 were calculated with the theory summarized in Section 3 for homogeneous Pareto(2) portfolios; they speak for themselves. Also note that the numerical values reported are very much in line with the asymptotics as presented in (3.13) and (3.14) together with (4.2), and this already for
Some numerical examples
Also note that in this Pareto example, the VaR-MU spread is much larger than the ES-MU spread, suggesting that ES is "more robust" than VaR with respect to dependence uncertainty. We want to stress that often, in industry, VaR α (X + d ) is reported as the capital upper bound for operational risk within the Loss Distribution Approach (LDA). "Diversification arguments" are then used in order to obtain a 10 to 30 % deduction. In Table 4 (d = 8) this leads to a capital charge of around 170 to 220, the worst possible VaR however being 465. In this case, the results reported in Section 3 tell us that the full VaR-range [31, 465] is attainable (given that all marginal dfs are Pareto(2)); more research is needed concerning the question "which interdependencies (copulas) yield VaR values in the superadditivity range [245, 465] ". We will comment on this question in Section 5. For the moment it suffices to understand that statements like "diversification yields" have to be taken with care; financial institutions indeed need to carefully explain where such diversification deductions come from. This is not just an academic issue; for instance, FINMA, the Swiss regulator, ordered UBS to increase its capital reserves against litigation, compliance and operational risks by 50%. Financial Times (2013) reports that: "FINMA's move, which UBS expects will increase its risk-weighted assets [RWAs] by SFr 28 bn." Banks 
Example 4.2 (an inhomogeneous portfolio)
In Table 5 we present an inhomogeneous portfolio in line with Proposition 3.4. We have three types of marginal dfs, Pareto(2), Exponential (1) One could compare and contrast the numbers more in detail or include other dfs/parameters. The main point however is that, using the results reported in Section 3 and the RA, these numbers can actually be calculated ; see for instance the recent paper Aas and Puccetti (2013) where the RA is applied to a real bank's portfolio.
31 64 60 77 100 1.2833 1.299
31 107 179 277 301 1.5475 1.087 Ziegel (2013) . An interesting question that early on emerged from this research was: "Do there exist (non-trivial) coherent (i.e. subadditive) risk measures which are elicitable?" A positive answer is to be found in Ziegel (2013) and Bellini and Bignozzi (2013) : the τ -expectiles.
The τ -expectile, 0 < τ < 1, for an rv X with E[X 2 ] < ∞ is defined as
It is the unique solution x of the equation
For τ = 1/2, e 1/2 (X) = E[X]. One can show that for 0 < τ < 1, e τ is elicitable; for 1/2 ≤ τ < 1, e τ is subadditive, whereas for 0 < τ ≤ 1/2, e τ is superadditive. Moreover, e τ is not comonotone additive. In Bellini and Bignozzi (2013) it is shown that, under a standard technical condition, the only elicitable and coherent risk measures are the expectiles. We are not advocating e τ as the risk measure to use, but mainly want to show the kind of research which is triggered by parts of Basel 3.5. For more information, see for instance and Delbaen (2013) . Early contributions are to be found in Rémillard (2013) (Section 4.4.4.1).
We do mention the above publications as on p.60 in BCBS (2012) it is mentioned that "Spectral risk measures are a promising generalization of ES that is cited in the literature." As mentioned above, it is shown that non-trivial law-invariant spectral risk measures such as ES are not elici Whereas the picture concerning backtesting across risk measures needs further discussion, the situation becomes even more blurred when a notion of robustness is added. In its broadest sense, robustness has to do with (in)sensitivity to underlying model deviations and/or data changes. Also here, a whole new field of research is opening up; at the moment it is difficult to point to the right approach. The quotes and the references below give the interested reader some insight on the underlying issues and different approaches. The spectrum goes from a pure statistical one, like in Huber and Ronchetti (2009) , to a more economics decision making one, like Hansen and Sargent (2007) The main point of the comments above is that "there is more to robustness than meets the eye". In many ways, in some form or another, robustness lies at the core of financial and insurance risk management. Below we gathered some quotes on the topic which readers may find interesting to follow-up; we briefly add a comment when relevant in the light of our paper as presented so far.
Quote 1 (from Kou et al. (2013) ): "Coherent risk measures are not robust". The authors champion Median Shortfall, defined in an obvious manner. This measure was for instance used in the analysis of operational risk data in Moscadelli (2004) . Note however that Median Shortfall is a VaR at a higher confidence level.
Quote 2 (from Stahl (2009)): "Use stress testing based on mixture models [. . .] contamination." In practice one often uses so-called contamination; this amounts to model constructions of the type (1 − )F + G with 0 < < 1 and typically small. In this case, the df F corresponds to "normal" behavior whereas G corresponds to a stress component. In Stahl (2009) this approach is also championed and embedded in a broader Bayesian Ansatz.
Quote 3 (from Cont et al. (2010) ) "Our results illustrate in particular, that using recently proposed risk measures such as CVaR/Expected Shortfall leads to a less robust risk measurement procedure than Valueat-Risk."
Quote 4 (from Cambou and Filipović (2013) ) "ES is robust, and VaR is non-robust based on the notion of φ-divergence."
Quote 5 (from Krätschmer et al. (2013) ) "We argue here that Hampel's classical notion of quantitative robustness is not suitable for risk measurement and we propose and analyse a refined notion of robustness that applies to tail-dependent law-invariant convex risk measures on Orliz spaces."
First of all, the reference to "Hampel's classical notion" is in line with the more statistical approach to robustness, as presented in Huber and Ronchetti (2009) . Second, these authors introduce an index of quantitative robustness. As a consequence, and this somewhat in contrast to Quotes 1 and 3: "This new look at robustness will then help us to bring the argument against coherent risk measures back into perspective: robustness is not lost entirely but only to some degree when VaR is replaced by a coherent risk measure such as ES."
The above quotes hopefully bring the robustness in "robust backtesting" somewhat into perspective. More discussions with regulators are needed in order to understand what precisely is intended when formulating this aspect of future regulation. As we already stressed, the multi-facetted notion of robustness must be key to any financial business and consequently regulation. In its broadest interpretation as "resilience against or awareness of model and data sensitivity" this ought to be clear to all involved. How to make this awareness more tangible is a key task going forward.
Conclusion
The recent financial crises have shown how unreliably some quantitative tools perform in stormy markets.
Through its Basel 3.5 documents BCBS (2012) and BCBS (2013a), the Basel Committee has opened up the discussion in order to make the international banking world a safer place for all involved. Admittedly, our contribution to the choice of risk measure for the potential supervision of market risk is only a minor one and only touches upon a small aspect of the above regulatory documents. We do however hope that some of the methodology, examples and research reviews presented will contribute to a better understanding of the issues at hand. On some of the issues, our views are clear, like "In the finite mean case, ES is a superior risk measure to to the corresponding VaR estimates in the worst case dependence scenarios. Both however remain statistical quantities, the estimation of which is marred by model risk and data scarcity. The frequency rather than severity thinking is also very much embedded in other fields of finance; think for instance of the calibrations used by rating agencies for securitization products (recall the (in)famous CDO senior equity tranches) or companies (transition and default probabilities). Backtesting models to data remains a crucial aspect throughout finance; elicitability and prequentist forecasting add new aspects to this discussion. Robustness remains, for the moment at least, somewhat elusive. Our brief review of some of the recent work, and this motivated by Basel 3.5, will hopefully entice more academic as well as practical research and discussions on these very important themes.
